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Abstract  
Inferentialists about scientific representation hold that an apparatus’s representing a target system 
consists in the apparatus allowing “surrogative inferences” about the target. I argue that a serious 
problem for inferentialism arises from the fact that many scientific theories and models contain 
internal inconsistencies. Inferentialism, left unamended, implies that inconsistent scientific models 
have unlimited representational power, since an inconsistency permits any conclusion to be 
inferred. I consider a number of ways that inferentialists can respond to this challenge before 
suggesting my own solution. I develop an analogy to exploitable glitches in a game. Even though 
inconsistent representational apparatuses may in some sense allow for contradictions to be 
generated within them, doing so violates the intended function of the apparatus’s parts and hence 
violates representational “gameplay.”  
  
 
1 Introduction  
  
Scientific representations come in all sorts. One can use a concrete system of sticks and balls to 
represent a molecule, a pair of mathematical equations to represent an ecosystem, a squiggly line 
and some arrows drawn on a page to represent electromagnetic interactions between subatomic 
particles, and so on. The aim of an account of scientific representation to provide a general answer 
to the following question: what does it mean for any abstract or concrete apparatus to count as a 
scientific representation of a particular system? 
  
Inferentialists about scientific representation hold that the representation relation between a 
representational apparatus like a model or simulation and its target system is constituted by the 
apparatus’s ability to facilitate inferences of a certain kind about that target. By inferentialists' 
lights, the hallmark of scientific representation is not some particular mind-independent relation 
that an apparatus bears to its target, like isomorphism or similarity. Rather, what makes an 
apparatus a representation of a target system is the extent to which cognitive agents can use it to 
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make “surrogative inferences” about that target, so-called because those inferences require treating 
the apparatus as a surrogate for manipulating and intervening on the target.  
  
This paper argues that inferentialism must be amended to avoid a serious problem. This problem 
arises from the observation that many representational apparatuses used in scientific practice are 
internally inconsistent, together with the simple fact that (classically) any inference can be drawn 
from an inconsistency. Inferentialists must thus amend their view so that only a particular kind of 
(or way of drawing) surrogative inference legitimately contributes to an apparatus’s 
representational capacity. I shall begin by introducing inferentialism in more detail. Then, I present 
the challenge for inferentialists, consider some possible responses, and argue for my own solution.  
  
2 Inferentialism: A Primer  
  
When we speak of scientific representation, which relation are we speaking of? Inferentialists 
answer: what is essential to and constitutive of scientific representation is that it is inferential. 
What scientific representation most fundamentally is, they say, is a capacity for surrogative 
inference and reasoning, viz., the kind of reasoning in which an apparatus is manipulated, 
intervened on, and so on, in place of its target. 
 
To illustrate, consider a representational apparatus as a tiny world of its own, complete with its 
own laws and nomological structure, which can be manipulated and intervened on.1 In the process 
of surrogative reasoning about some concrete target system using this tiny “world”, one first 
denotes elements of the target system with certain elements of the representational system, then 
determines what happens in the representational system when, say, a certain variable is 
manipulated. Finally, these events or facts within the representational system are interpreted in 
terms of the concrete system the apparatus denotes.2 To call on a well-worn example, when one 
uses a subway map, one first denotes concrete objects with different parts of the map (colored lines 
 
1 This notion is originally due primarily to R.I.G Hughes’s (1997) “denotation-demonstration-interpretation” view of 
scientific representation, as well as Robert Sugden's (2000, 2009) view of scientific models as "credible worlds". 
2 Cf. Bueno and Colyvan (2011), de Donato Rodriguez and Zamora Bonilla (2009, p102-103), Hughes (1997), 
Sugden (2000, 2009), Suárez (2004, 2015), Swoyer (1991). 
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denote rail lines, white dots denote stops, etc.). Then, when you want to learn how to get from one 
stop to another, you do something within the map. A fact about what obtains in the map (the tracing 
of your finger, along a colored line, from one white dot to another) is then interpreted as a fact 
about the concrete target system whose parts have been denoted with the different elements in the 
map.  
 
Inferentialism comes in many forms. Some inferentialists articulate versions of the view where an 
apparatus’s capacity to be used in this surrogative capacity is that in virtue of which representations 
count as representations at all (Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2015, p3827). Other inferentialists defend 
a more deflationary tone, on which there is nothing more substantive that one can say about the 
relation of scientific representation except that it occurs exactly when there is a capacity for 
surrogative reasoning (Suárez 2004, 2015). Others say that it is interpretations of those parts of a 
representation which allow for surrogative reasoning that truly render an apparatus representational 
(Contessa 2007). Whatever differences there may end up being, the key hallmark of all 
inferentialist views is that scientific representation is primarily characterized by its functional role 
(cf. Chakravartty 2010). That is, what makes a scientific representation is a capacity to facilitate 
certain kinds of cognitive activities or epistemic goals, and chiefly for inferentialists, the activity 
of surrogative inference. 
 
When it comes to other accounts of scientific representation, inferentialists are happy to admit that 
features like qualitative or structural similarity can facilitate surrogative reasoning. As Suárez notes 
in his original defense of the inferential view, surrogative reasoning “requires [a model] to have 
the internal structure that allows informed agents to correctly draw [surrogative] inferences” (2004, 
p774). But what distinguishes inferentialism from other views that might more heavily emphasize 
these qualitative or structural relations is that these relations are viewed as mere means by which 
an apparatus allows for more or fewer inferences to be made. By inferentialists’ lights, it is their 
common byproduct—the possibility of surrogative inferences regarding a target—that ultimately 
constitute the fact that the apparatus represents what it does.  
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3 The Challenge from Inconsistent Idealizations  
  
I shall argue that inferentialism faces a serious challenge. The challenge shows that it cannot be 
the case that all that scientific representation amounts to, unqualifiedly, is inferential power. 
Instead, it must be a particular kind of surrogative inference (or way of drawing surrogative 
inferences) that constitutes representational capacity.  
  
The challenge arises from the simple observation that representational apparatuses in science 
(theories, models, etc.) are sometimes logically inconsistent, or at least are idealized in logically 
inconsistent ways. It is well-known that competing models of the same phenomenon can often 
represent that phenomenon in logically incompatible ways, such as models of water that represent 
water either as continuous, or as composed of particles. But there are some internally inconsistent 
models and theories. A few plausible examples are:  
• Bohr’s theory of the atom (a canonical example)  
• The old quantum theory of blackbody radiation (see Norton 1987)  
• Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory (Saatsi and Vickers 2011, Buchwald and Yeang 2012)  
• Lorentz’s early theory of the electron (Vickers 2013, §6)  
In each of these cases, it is possible to derive both p and ¬p within the theory for some p. In at least 
a few of these examples, the theory or model is logically inconsistent because some assumptions 
within the theory require certain quantum mechanical principles to be true, while other assumptions 
require contradictory classical principles to be true. This seems to be the case with Bohr’s theory 
of the atom, which ends up representing orbiting electrons both as emitting radiation and not 
emitting radiation. It is also the case with the old quantum blackbody theory of radiation (Norton 
1987). But whatever the basis of the inconsistency happens to be, these all seem to be plausible 
examples where a scientific theory or model taken as a whole contains a contradiction.3 
 
3 Note the phrase “taken as a whole”. Inferentialism claims, again, that a model’s representing a target consist in its 
facilitating surrogative inferences about that target; this is a claim about what entire models do or don’t facilitate. In 
a few moments (§4.2), I consider whether the inferentialist can respond to the specter of inconsistency by appealing 
to what specific parts of a model do or don’t facilitate. Additionally, I am aware that recent work on inconsistent 
scientific theories suggests that even if there is inconsistency in a theory “taken as a whole”, scientific theories or 
models are rarely inconsistent in practice or when understood correctly (see, e.g., Vickers 2013). Proposals on 
understanding why they are not inconsistent in practice inform my own solution, which relies on an analogy to 
legitimate moves in gameplay. I defend my solution in Section 5 of this paper. 
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Inferentialists say that the representational capacity of an apparatus just is its capacity to facilitate 
surrogative inferences, i.e., inferences from facts within a model to facts about its target. This 
cannot be true of all surrogative inferences unrestrictedly. For with an inconsistent representational 
apparatus, if all that it is for it to represent a target (and how well) is which surrogative inferences 
a cognitive agent can perform with it, a competent agent can draw literally any surrogative 
inference she likes. She can simply start with the fact that each of p and ¬p obtains somewhere 
within the representational system, infer their conjunction, and validly infer that some arbitrary q 
obtains. Voíla! Since this can be done for any arbitrary q, an internally inconsistent apparatus has 
unlimited inferential power. And thus, by the inferentialist’s lights, it also has unlimited 
representational power regarding its target, i.e., allows any inference whatsoever to be drawn about 
the target. Additionally, not only will an inconsistent apparatus allow its users to infer anything 
they like about their target for free, one can also use an inconsistent apparatus to represent any 
other target one likes. Simply denote the elements of any arbitrary concrete system with a few 
soon-to-be-inferred terms in the apparatus and infer away! If inferentialism is true, inconsistent 
representational apparatuses also universally represent.  
  
Obviously, something is amiss. To be sure, inferring any arbitrary q from an apparatus’s internal 
logical inconsistency is a classically valid inference. But it cannot plausibly be the kind of inference 
that constitutes the fact that an apparatus represents what it represents, with whatever fidelity of 
representation it does. There must be some restriction on which kinds of surrogative inferences 
actually count as constituting an apparatus’s representational capacity. In other words, these kinds 
of “explosive” surrogative inferences (hereafter “explosive inferences”), that merely exploit a 
contradiction in an inconsistent model to infer something, must be ruled out. Inferentialism must 
be revised such that representation happens not simply only when apparatus facilitates surrogative 
inferences regarding a target, but such that only a particular kind of surrogative inference, or some 
particular way of performing surrogative inferences is representation-constituting. 
 
4 Some Preliminary Solutions  
  
4.1  Consistent Sub-Representations?  
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This section of the paper discusses a few solutions to the puzzle and argues that they are 
unsatisfactory or incomplete in some way. Here is an initial response to the challenge that ought to 
seem plausible. When faced with the challenge from inconsistent idealizations, one might observe 
that even if an apparatus contains an internal inconsistency, it will rarely be the case that every part 
of the apparatus is inconsistent with every other part. One might accordingly modify inferentialism 
in a way that meets the challenge: one might suggest that an apparatus is a representation of 
whatever target system its noncontradictory parts facilitate surrogative inferences about. The right 
kind of surrogative inference, on this view, is the kind that uses only the non-contradictory parts 
of a representation. In other words, the representational capacity of an internally inconsistent 
representational apparatus is constituted by the inferential capacity of its consistent sub-
representations. 4  This would seem to resolve the problem posed by internally inconsistent 
idealizations. 
  
This solution is unsatisfactory. One initial reason to reject it is that it may not generalize. There are 
some cases of inconsistency in a representational apparatus where there may not be any consistent 
sub-representations. Kirchhoff's diffraction theory, previously mentioned, might be one example 
(Saatsi and Vickers 2011).  
  
But the real reason why this revised inferentialism should be rejected is that on inspection, it does 
not succeed at its appointed task. The view cannot account for the source of an inconsistent model's 
representational power. For even if an internally inconsistent representation has a number of 
consistent sub-representations, those sub-representations cannot explain why the entire 
inconsistent thing represents what it does. Let me illustrate by considering Kirchhoff's diffraction 
theory in more detail. It is a representation of a light-screen-aperture system, visualized below. 
  
 
4 This response bears a number of similarities to the “content-driven” means of explaining why internally inconsistent 
scientific theories are empirically successful (Norton 1987, Saatsi 2014). Also, this response bears a misleading 
resemblance in name only to the “partial structures” view of interpreting inconsistent scientific theories, defended by 
Bueno and French (2011), da Costa and French (2003), among others. 
   7  
  
The theory contains the following content (some of which is obviously idealized):  
i. The Fresnel-Kirchhoff diffraction formula describes a light's post-aperture amplitude at 






[cos(𝑛, 𝑟) − cos	(𝑛, 𝑠)]𝑑𝑆
!
 
ii. The light at the aperture behaves as if the screen were not there,  
iii. The light source emits a spherical field,  
iv. And the amplitude of light and its derivative are zero immediately behind the screen.  
(Some purely mathematical parts of the model, i.e. the “Sommerfeld radiation condition”, are 
omitted.) To briefly describe the inconsistency in this theory, (ii)--(iv) and the omitted 
mathematical portions of the theory (the Helmholtz-Kirchhoff integral theorem and the 
Sommerfeld radiation condition) together derive (i), the Fresnel-Kirchhoff diffraction formula. But 
that formula in (i) is inconsistent with what (ii) and (iv) themselves say about the light-
screenaperture system, specifically U(P) and its derivative.5 
  
The suggestion is supposed to be that the representational power of the entire inconsistent theory, 
and the facts about what that theory represents, are constituted by the representational and 
inferential power of proper subsets of {(i)…(iv)}. But consider what those sub-representations are 
actually like. They ascribe very different properties to the light-screen-aperture system than the 
conjunction of all four. That is, they represent that concrete target system as being very different 
 
5 See Saatsi and Vickers (2011). Their formulation of the Fresnel-Kirchoff diffraction formula, which I follow here, 
is taken from Born and Wolf (1999, ch.6). For more discussion of the history of Fresnel’s theory of diffraction, see 
Buchwald and Yeang (2016), who discuss, among other things, how Kirchoff’s inconsistent theory remained more 
empirically successful than some later alternatives which were internally consistent. 
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ways. Or better yet: consider them in the inferentialist's preferred way, as tiny worlds that are 
surrogates for the concrete target system. Each of those sub-representations constitutes a very 
different “surrogate system” than the one that is constituted by conjoining all of (i)--(iv). Each 
system has distinct properties. Indeed, most of these different representations disagree with the 
others about whether some element in the target system has a particular property.  
  
This is important because, to begin with, it seems false that each of these candidate surrogate 
systems is a sub-representation of the bigger, inconsistent thing they disagree with. But 
additionally, it’s not clear how each of these differing representations is supposed to account for 
the representational power of the entire, inconsistent apparatus. For again, each of these “sub”-
models and the entire, inconsistent model disagree about which surrogate facts there are. If they 
disagree with one another, then how are they also jointly supposed to generate some consistent 
representational power? Because of this problem, this solution is unable to account for there being 
some univocal fact about which target the model as a whole represents and how well it does so.   
  
4.2 Hybrid Inferentialism?  
  
A second kind of response that the inferentialist might make is to suggest that the admissible, 
representation-constituting inferences are those that are allowed by the parts of the model that are 
similar, isomorphic, homomorphic, etc., to the target system. While every inferentialist view is 
happy to agree that structural or qualitative features of a representational apparatus are what “allow 
for” or facilitate surrogative inference (Suárez 2004, p773), this suggestion goes one step further 
and hybridizes inferentialism with another view of scientific representation. On the view being 
suggested, it is a necessary condition on the surrogative inferences that constitute a model’s 
representational capacity that they be performed not just with any structure of the model, but with 
those parts that are sufficiently similar, isomorphic, or what have you. Since nature doesn’t contain 
any contradictions that models might thereby map onto, it will always be impermissible to use a 
contradiction in an inconsistent model as the basis of a surrogative inference—so, prima facie, the 
problem is solved.  
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While this solution might seem plausible, it will ultimately prove unsatisfying, especially by 
inferentialists’ own lights. This suggestion reintroduces the problem that representation tout court 
should not be conflated with accurate representation (cf. Suárez 2003), and indeed, part of the 
reason inferentialism was supposed to be attractive in the first place is that it does not make this 
mistake. For these reasons, this suggested solution should be rejected by inferentialists outright. 
To recall these problems, the relations ‘…is isomorphic to…’ and ‘…is similar to…’ will only ever 
apply to the parts of a representational apparatus that successfully stand in the relevant relation 
with regard to the target. Agnes Bolinska notes, too, that any way of filling in how the structure of 
a model allows for surrogative inferences that trades on notions like isomorphism and similarity 
would “imply that a vehicle can be an epistemic representation of a target only if a user is able to 
draw inferences that are true of the target, yet Suárez explicitly states that the inferential account 
is meant to be an account of mere, rather than true or accurate, representation” (Bolinska 2013, 
p225). What this means is that if one has a representational apparatus with even a minor inaccuracy, 
a hybridized inferentialism won’t have the resources to explain how it manages to be a 
representation at all. This familiar worry is especially pressing in cases of models that contain 
idealizations like dimensionless quantities, i.e., quantities in a model for which there is no 
corresponding physical parameter or quantity. It would be a hard bullet to bite indeed to suggest 
that no admissible representational surrogative inferences can be performed using parts of a model 
which are heavily idealized or dimensionless.  
 
These sorts of problems are well-known, and defenders of other accounts of representation may 
well have strategies for responding to them. But the present point is that if there is any satisfying 
role for relations like similarity on an inferentialist account of representation, it must be that such 
relations facilitate successful representation without constituting it or being sufficient for it. Anjan 
Chakravartty, writing on this same point, argues that,  
“Scientific representation is achieved only in circumstances in which agents know or have 
otherwise mastered the system of representation being used to encode information about 
whatever it is that is represented. That is why relations such as similarity cannot do the job 
on their own.” (2010, p205) 
The puzzle we’re currently concerned with is what explains why only some, but not all, surrogative 
inferences performed using an internally inconsistent model are constitutive of its representational 
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capacity. As Chakravartty observes, one in general should not expect relationships of similarity to 
suffice by themselves for accounting for the intentionality involved in scientific representation. 
Hence even when it comes to our challenge regarding inconsistent idealizations, there is no reason 
to suspect that relationships like similarity will by themselves account for those intentional or 
surrogative features of representation deemed essential in any inferential picture. It is plausible 
that agents’ practice, skills, or at least the intended goals of representation are also required for a 
full solution. 
 
4.3 Cognitive Factors?   
  
Let us now turn to agential factors, especially, cognitive factors. So far, we have considered 
solutions to the challenge from inconsistent idealizations that turn on something about the intrinsic 
features of a representational apparatus (e.g., consistent sub-representations). But as just 
mentioned, one might suggest that factors that concern agents’ own cognitive states regarding 
scientific representations can provide more promising solutions. 
  
First, consider a version of a view on which agents’ interpretations of inconsistent models are what 
explain why explosive surrogative inferences don’t help constitute those models’ representational 
capacity. Gabriele Contessa defends a version of inferentialism on which “a model is a 
representation of a certain system in virtue of the fact that a user interprets the model in terms of 
the system” (2007, p67). Surrogative reasoning is still essential to scientific representation, but in 
fact surrogative reasoning is derivative on agential interpretation. What motivates this picture is 
the idea that without any interpretation in terms of a target system, the process of surrogative 
inference would just amount to tinkering around within a model for its own sake: it is interpretation 
that turns a model into a surrogate for a target, and hence a representation.  
  
If one adopts a view like Contessa’s, where the surrogative inferences a model licenses are due to 
an antecedent interpretation of the model, then there seems like there’d be an answer to the 
challenge posed by internally inconsistent models. Maybe this is the answer: surrogative inferences 
that exploit contradictions in a model aren’t among those that are constitutive of a model’s 
representational capacity, because there are no contradictory interpretations of inconsistent models.  
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This solution certainly sounds promising. But unfortunately, it will not succeed. The reason is due 
to what it means to have an interpretation of a model, on inferentialist views of representation. 
Remember how the interpretation-step of the surrogative reasoning process works: a user of the 
model interprets some surrogate fact as a fact about the target system. All this requires is that there 
is some interpretation or another— not necessarily a good or truth-preserving one—of parts of the 
model in terms of the target, and you can fruitfully complete the surrogative process. For just like 
other inferentialist views, Contessa’s interpretational view is supposed to be an account of 
representation tout court, without conflating it with successful or accurate representation (Contessa 
2007, p63).  
  
There are thus two problems with this interpretational view. First, interpretation does not avoid the 
challenge from inconsistent idealizations at all. For the only place that interpretation comes into 
the surrogate reasoning process is after some within-the-model facts have been ascertained. As 
soon as the model itself has a particular structure, all that an interpretation can do is “read off” that 
structure in terms of the target system. If there is a contradiction within a model, an interpretation 
can’t get rid of it, and it more importantly can’t disallow its use within the model. Second, an 
interpretational view actually makes the problem worse in some respects. Remember, an 
interpretation only requires some denotation of target-objects using model-objects. Indeed, as 
Agnes Bolinska (2013, p223) argues, one can merely stipulate by fiat some interpretation that 
connects the model to any arbitrary target. But this means that an interpretational inferentialism 
overgenerates representational capacity in much the same way that explosive inferences using an 
inconsistent model threaten to: just stipulate whatever interpretation you like! Perhaps a different 
definition of what interpretation requires can avoid this, but as-is, the standardly thin definition of 
interpretation on inferential views in fact exacerbates the overgeneration problem. 
 
A second feature of agents’ cognitive factors that might help resolve the challenge from 
inconsistent idealizations is the extent to which an agent has know-how regarding the proper use 
of a model. In particular, Javier González de Prado Salas et al. (2017) argue for an inferentialist 
view of idealization (rather than representation more generally) that allows for degrees of cognitive 
commitment. For instance, when using idealizations, “one becomes committed to it just within the 
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scope of the relevant episode of hypothetical or approximative reasoning” (González de Prado 
Salas et al., 2017, p15).6 This seems quite plausible: accepting an idealization in a model does not 
involve believing that it is true; it merely means utilizing its predictive capacity, then discharging 
soon after. This “temporary acceptance” picture of the epistemic utility of idealizations can be 
applied to present purposes. If an agent has the right know-how regarding the use of an inconsistent 
model, she will know how to use each half of a contradiction to perform some surrogative 
inference, then discharge it, thereby avoiding any contradiction and any explosive surrogative 
inferences. 
  
While this view is plausible in the aforementioned respects, one must be careful to note that it 
cannot solely be agential know-how or cognitive states that rule out certain surrogative inferences 
as impermissible or not genuinely representational. For such a suggestion would turn inferentialism 
too much into an “agent-based” view of representation, i.e., one on which representation depends 
entirely on some agent or another’s occurrent cognitive states. Such a heavily agent-based solution 
would actually fail, in the end, to recover the kernel of inferentialism about representation. For by 
the lights of inferentialism about scientific representation (as opposed to, say, inferentialism about 
the epistemic utility of idealization), what it is for a model to represent its target just is for it or its 
structure to allow for surrogative inferences (cf. Suárez 2004, p771; Contessa 2007, p53; 
Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2015, p3835). Of course, this will still involve some kind of reference to 
agents’ abilities and interests, but it is thinner than any reference to occurrent cognitive states. 
Contessa (2007, p52) makes this point explicit: “a user does not necessarily need to perform any 
actual piece of surrogative reasoning in order for the vehicle to be an epistemic representation of 
the target…she would have been able to perform one of those inferences if only the occasion had 
arisen.” In other words, for a full-blooded inferentialist view of representation, the 
representationmaking facts are supposed to be due to models’ own inferential potential, not due to 
any occurrent mental states like know-how or temporary commitment. Chalking up representation 
to something about agents’ know-how ends up being too much of a modification. Even if there 
weren’t any users who occurrently knew the skillset associated with adopting a model, it should 
still be the case that that model represents its target by facilitating certain inferences regarding it. 
 
6 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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So, while initially helpful, inferentialists must move on from an agent-based view like this one or 
at least clarify it in a way that is more amenable to the spirit of the view. 
   
5 Surrogative Inferences and the Representation Game  
 
5.1 Playing the Representation Game  
  
Let me briefly take stock of where we have ventured so far. We have seen that inferentialist 
accounts of scientific representation face a challenge posed by internally inconsistent scientific 
models. Without a restriction on the kind of surrogative inferences that contribute to an apparatus’s 
representational power, a restriction that rules out trivial, “explosive” inferences, we would have 
the implausible result that an internally inconsistent model represents absolutely everything (but 
merely trivially).  
   
I wish to introduce an analogy. Many single-player and competitive games contain exploitable 
glitches in gameplay. One could list off many examples of games like this. But the most illustrative 
examples for our purposes are glitches in computer or video games that allow for the completion 
of certain tasks outside the normal bounds of gameplay. If, for instance, a task that a video game 
requires of the player is that the player avatar retrieve an item from within a particular cage, it 
might be the case that there are a few permitted ways to do it, all of which involve actually opening 
the cage. But a common glitch in these kinds of scenarios is that the player can manipulate game 
mechanics in such a way that her avatar is pushed through the normally-impenetrable walls of the 
cage. By exploiting these kinds of behaviors—being pushed through walls, falling through floors, 
etc.—players can accomplish the same tasks they are asked to accomplish normally but in much 
shorter timespans (e.g., in “speedrunning”).  
  
Now, consider the fact that if a player retrieves the caged item by exploiting a glitch, there is at 
least some sense in which she hasn’t done anything wrong—after all, the game doesn’t crash. 
Moreover, glitches are in fact caused by the way that certain parts of actual gameplay are coded 
(e.g., how one sprite’s “hitbox” behaves, or in other cases, the developers neglecting to put a ceiling 
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in some rooms). In other words, the game indeed does allow for such events to occur. However, 
even though the game in fact allows for these events to occur, there is a clear sense in which, if a 
player uses the exploits, she fails to successfully play the game. Retrieve an item by opening its 
cage in any of the intended ways? That constitutes actual gameplay. Retrieve it by glitching 
through the walls? That is allowed, but there is a clear sense in which it does not really count as 
having played the game. Even though both kinds of actions are “allowed” by the game, the first 
but not the second constitutes gameplay because it uses the game’s elements to serve their intended 
functions.7  
  
Internally inconsistent scientific representations are like games with exploitable glitches. The 
behaviors and properties of their constituents can be manipulated, allowing for tasks to be 
completed that could also be completed by obeying those behaviors’ proper role and scope. Recall 
Kirchhoff’s theory of diffraction and Bohr’s model of the atom. Kirchhoff’s theory is remarkably 
accurate regarding changes in the amplitude of light, Bohr’s regarding emission and absorption 
spectra, yet both contain contradictions. The simple but important observation I want to make is 
that despite this obvious problem, there is nothing objectionable about using the Fresnel-Kirchhoff 
formula to calculate the post-aperture amplitude U(P) or using a graphic of electron orbitals in 
Bohr's model to teach students true things about molecular bonding. And the reason seems to be 
that doing so would constitute a use of those features of the models that they were intended for. 
On the other hand, if one chooses to “speedrun” the model by generating a contradiction, it is quite 
clear that generating a contradiction and exploiting some features of classical logic cannot be the 
intended function of having represented, e.g., electrons or light a particular way. This seems true 
even though it would not be in violation of any logical principles to exploit the contradictions 
inherent in inconsistent models. In other words, there are non-logical norms on what constitutes 
representational “gameplay” that are exerted by features about the model, or its context or aims.  
  
 
7 Zamora Bonilla (2006) defends an idea of the aims of scientific research as a persuasion game, drawing on the 
analogous notion from the philosophy of language. My approach here is aimed at understanding scientific 
representation, not entire research programs, and also does not rely on the idea of a “persuasion game” in 
philosophy of language. Nevertheless, because his account of the aims of scientific research is both inferentialist in 
nature and relies on the idea of gameplay, there are similarities between his work and mine.  
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I want to be careful here before proceeding further to clarify that my appeal to “gameplay” is a 
mere analogy. Indeed, while some other recent developments in philosophy of science have 
appealed to games, there is at least one prominent case where inferentialists should not and cannot 
avail themselves of a deeper analysis of representation in terms of gameplay.8 
   
Prominently, some recent work on scientific representation claims that idealized models either 
literally are fictions or are analogous in important respects to fictions (Frigg 2010, Toon 2010, 
2012, Levy 2015, among many others). Of particular note are Adam Toon (2010, 2012) and Arnon 
Levy (2012, 2015), who hold that scientific representation is to represent targets in a fictionalized 
way. Their views are noteworthy because Toon in particular develops an analogy with Kendall 
Walton’s (1990) idea of “games of make-believe.” Like my account, Toon’s account of 
representation makes use of the idea of rules of gameplay (specifically, Toon’s view has it that 
idealized models involve games of make-believe about concrete targets, e.g., imagining chemical 
bonds as the wooden sticks in a ball-and-stick molecule).  
 
However, Toon and Levy defend the view that scientific representation is (as they say) direct. It’s 
not the case that representation involves any relation at all between a distinct model system and a 
target system, as inferentialists and others would have it; instead, it merely involves imagining 
false things about the target. This difference is a deep one. Levy (2015) himself notes that direct 
representation leaves unanswered the question of how, if at all, model users are to infer or learn 
anything about the target from such imaginings. And Frigg and Nguyen (2016) observe that 
imaginings about a target don’t license any inferences about what the target is actually like. Even 
within Walton’s notion of “make-believe”, they show, nothing accounts for how surrogative 
reasoning can ever get off the ground, let alone be informative. In other words, direct 
representational views like Toon’s “games of make-believe” cannot easily and obviously account 
for how surrogative reasoning ever even happens. Inferentialists, for whom surrogative reasoning 
is literally constitutive of scientific representation, should thus be quite wary of taking 
 
8 An anonymous referee helpful points out that initial area of similarity to previous gameplay-based analogies is to 
Jaakko Hintikka’s (1973) game-theoretic semantics for natural language and first-order logic, which Jesús Zamora 
Bonilla (2003) has utilized for understanding properties of scientific theories, like testability.8 This extant literature is 
primarily concerned with giving a full analysis of certain semantic concepts in science in terms of certain kinds of 
gameplay in natural language, while my aim is to identify how non-logical norms on surrogative inferences may arise. 
Nevertheless, there may be a way to connect these issues. 
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representation to literally be a game of make-believe, or indeed, any direct view of scientific 
representation. There may yet be a solution to this problem in the offing, but my aim throughout 
this paper has been to defend inferentialism or modify it in a friendly way, and the simplest way 
to do so is without adopting a view such as Toon’s.  
  
Of course, inferentialists are not precluded from utilizing analogies to gameplay or fiction in other 
ways. Frigg and Nguyen develop a broadly inferentialist picture where representational constraints 
are “naturally analyzed as being involved in a game of make-believe” (2016b, p237). Suárez (2009) 
defends an inferentialist account of representation under which idealizations, viewed as fictions, 
provide background rules for expediency in surrogative inference. These other ways in which 
inferentialism can make use of analogies to gameplay or fiction are not motivated by worries about 
trivialization or inconsistent models, as my paper has been. And I have no objection to the 
possibility that these other concerns might ultimately motivate an inferentialism integrated with 
my own. Unfortunately, there isn’t space here to engage in more detail with these views, but it is 
again worth noting that as far as my own account goes, “gameplay” is merely an analogy. What is 
most central to my view, to reiterate the point introduced before, are the ways in which the 
behaviors and intended functions of particular parts of models can exert non-logical norms on how 
surrogative inferences can proceed.  
  
5.4 Explicating the View  
  
The only task remaining in this paper is to further clarify this key point. How can the behaviors 
and intended functions of particular parts of models exert non-logical norms on which surrogative 
inferences are permissible and constitutive of representational capacity? First, it is a datum that the 
components of a model have certain behaviors that comprise the ways in which scientific 
representations take on “a life of their own” (cf. Hughes 1997, pS331). So, before introducing how 
the intended functions of a model’s parts exert norms on which kinds of inferences are the 
legitimately representational ones, I wish to illustrate how the behavior of the internal world of a 
model itself does so. Consider how, in the world of a model, a quantity might be quantized rather 
than continuous, or its rate of change might be continuously differentiable; some variable might 
be designated to evolve nonlinearly, one variable’s growth might be causally dependent on another, 
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and so on. To see how inferential norms arise from these, remember that surrogative inferences are 
supposed to start by determining what happens in the world of a representation, and consider a 
simple example using the ideal gas law PV = nRT. Imagine that a student uses the ideal gas law to 
calculate the difference in temperature of a particular sample of gas as the gas’s volume is 
decreased, and another student says: “Oh, no, you’ve done that wrong: your value for the final 
temperature needs to be lower than what you’ve calculated, since all gases in fact lose temperature 
over time.”   
  
It seems clear that it is this second student who is actually in error. By suggesting that the first 
student’s use of the ideal gas law’s mathematical model needs to incorporate the slight losses in 
temperature of observed gases, she misunderstands how that apparatus is to be used. She gets its 
world wrong. Correcting the ideal value when we use ‘PV=nRT’ obviously does not generate a 
contradiction, and in fact in many contexts it might be the sort of operation that is eventually 
required. So—importantly—there are no purely logical norms against correcting from the ideal 
temperature. But it is clearly a mistake to suggest that the model itself licenses the use of its own 
concept of temperature in a non-ideal way. The rules of the game of ‘PV=nRT’—its non-logical 
norms, in other words—declare the only permissible inferences within the model system to be 
those that accord with the idealizations of the kinetic theory of gases. So, if you were to infer within 
the model that a gas’s temperature falls off, clearly that would not be a use that constitutes the 
content with which that the model was intended to represent the world.9  
  
This is importantly different from the kind of view considered earlier, which was due to González 
de Prado Salas et al. (2017). By their lights, the sort of acceptance-then-discharging of the 
idealizations that this second student engages in is perfectly in line with cognitive states that would 
constitute a more general knowledge-how of using the model. But in the vignette given above, the 
second student is clearly in error because she corrects for a part of the model that violates the 
model’s own structure and gets its “world” wrong. But she is in error not just because she gets the 
world of the model wrong. It is a mistake, moreover, because regardless of cognitive states or her 
 
9 “…the representation has an internal dynamic whose effects we can examine […] The same result appears whether 
we use the mathematical or the material model. The internal dynamic of the mathematical model is supplied by a 
mixture of geometry and algebra, that of the material model by natural processes…The internal dynamic of a 
computer simulation of the phenomenon would be something else again.” (Hughes 1997, pS332).  
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correct factual knowledge regarding the intended physical targets, she is not using the model in its 
intended ways. One might say that the aim of the ideal gas law (and the kinetic theory of gases 
more generally) is to represent gases in an ideal way to fulfill certain functions, say, calculational 
tractability, or historically, for coherence with phenomenological thermodynamics. The fact that 
the so-called world of the model has certain features is thus tied to those functions. Failing to 
respect the model’s own world, even if it achieves accuracy simpliciter (like in the preceding 
vignette), can nevertheless mean that one is not using the model in its intended function. 
 
Hence, in identifying how non-logical norms on surrogative inferences are generated, the intended 
scope and function of the model’s properties and idealizations play the most important role. To see 
this point most clearly, it can be helpful to rely on a distinction first introduced by Mary Hesse.10 
Speaking of billiard-ball models of gas collision, she writes: 
“Let us call those properties we know belong to billiard balls and not to molecules the 
negative analogy of the model. Motion and impact, on the other hand, are just the properties 
of billiard balls that we do want to ascribe to molecules in our model, and these we can call 
the positive analogy.” (1966, p8) 
The point is that some but not all parts of models are intended by the initial modeler to have a 
representational function. One can endorse this general point without adopting Hesse’s distinction 
or even adopting wholesale the view that models are primarily analogies. It would be an obviously 
illegitimate use of an ideal billiard-ball model of gas collision, say, to use features of the model 
which are not intended in the first place to be representational in a representational way. Such 
illegitimate uses wouldn’t be informative at all regarding what the model represents, or how well 
it does so, etc. Inferentialists can easily adopt this idea. The legitimately representational uses of a 
model are limited to surrogative inferences performed using parts of the model that were either 
intended in the first place to be useful surrogatively, or those which might still (through further 
investigation) have some surrogative import.11 (Hesse calls this last kind “neutral”.) 
 
10 Thanks to Darrell Rowbottom for the helpful pointer about Hesse’s distinction, as well as some discussion on this 
general point. 
11 Darrell Rowbottom, writing on Hesse’s distinction as well, notes that “the positive analogy should be recast as 
involving the set of properties that the modeller expects to do some work (in furthering predictive power, 
understanding, or what have you)” (2019, p42). Additionally, it is worth noting that the so-called “neutral” analogy, 
can help explain what justifies the application of models constructed for one domain into another, in cases of “model 
transfer”. 
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When it comes to internally inconsistent models, the way in which the intended surrogative or 
representational aim of the parts of a model allow or disallow certain uses becomes even clearer. I 
have said that generating a contradiction and exploiting some features of classical logic cannot be 
the intended function of having represented, e.g., electrons or light a particular way. Indeed, even 
if those involved in constructing an internally inconsistent model were aware of the inconsistency, 
it is surely not the case that they intended the contradiction in a model to be exploited for nefarious, 
explosive purposes.12 
 
So, we have a solution at last to our puzzle about inconsistent idealizations. Why is it that 
inconsistent models don’t universally represent? Moreover, why is it the case that possible uses of 
inconsistent models that might exploit a contradiction don’t contribute anything toward its 
representational capacity, i.e., what it represents, or how well it does so? The answer is that the 
only legitimately representational uses of a model are those that cohere with the intended function 
of inferring something about the world, or put another way, inferring some information about some 
parts of the target in a surrogative capacity.13 The intended function of representing electrons, or 
whatever else, a particular way, must have been to infer information about the world, not to cheat 
classical logic. So, any usage of the representation that fails to even aim at that function—such as 
one that only aims to cheat classical logic—cannot be representation-constituting. 
 
The intended aims of a model during model-building also explain why the application conditions 
of some parts of a model are limited. Let us revisit Bohr’s model again, to illustrate how these 
informational aims determine which surrogative inferences are legitimate. Peter Vickers writes 
that “Bohr assumes that classical electrodynamics can be trusted, more or less, in its traditional 
domain of application. But the obvious flipside of this is that Bohr is assuming that classical 
electrodynamics does not apply to electrons strongly bound to atoms (with relatively low quantum 
 
12 And even if Bohr, or Kirchhoff, or whoever else, turned out secretly to have been a dialetheist, this would still not 
license exploiting a contradiction and using the principle of explosion, since most dialetheists reject the validity of 
explosion.  
13 Or, as Agnes Bolinska (2013) puts it, the intended function of interacting with or interpreting a model is to 
achieve informativeness about the target through faithful representation. See Bolinska’s paper for a more thorough 
discussion of varieties of interpretation in scientific representation, and what it means to have faithful representation 
as an aim.  
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number n)” (2013, p50). In other words, while it is trivial to say that the intended function of any 
model is to provide information, the classical portions of the Bohr model aim at informativeness 
about a particular domain of application. The fact that the model contains classical parts at all 
means that, if some user wanted to, she could exploit them to generate a contradiction with some 
relevant nonclassical parts. (This is, again, just like the way in which the code of a glitched game 
in some sense genuinely “allows” for their glitches to occur.) But doing so means using the model’s 
elements outside of their intended domain. Generating contradictions and exploiting some 
principles of classical logic are functions for which they could not possibly have been intended. 
  
This example also wards off an objection that, as we saw in previous sections, afflicts many other 
accounts of scientific representation: conflating accurate representation with representation tout   
court. Even though Bohr’s model was inaccurate regarding, e.g., the spin of electrons in the ground 
state, it should still clearly count as a model of the atom. But as we saw, solutions that say that the 
legitimately representational surrogative inferences are only those that use similar-or-isomorphic 
parts of a model runs afoul of this datum. On the other hand, on my analysis, using a within-the-
model fact about “Bohr electrons” to surrogatively infer false conclusions about actual electrons 
still counts as legitimately representational. Clearly, that is a use of Bohr electrons that fulfills their 
intended function, i.e., information about actual electrons. As long as one uses the parts of a model 
to at least try to infer information about the corresponding worldly target, one can represent that 
target without successfully gaining information. To revisit the gameplay analogy, it is possible to 
successfully play a game without winning it.  
  
Before closing, one might worry whether my view about function-cohering uses of a model can 
fully generalize beyond the example of Bohr’s atom that I have used so far. To be clear, Bohr’s 
atom is merely a helpful example since its derivational context is quite explicit. But even without 
this degree of explicitness, the broader point about legitimately representational uses of a model 
can still be made. And that broader point, which is fully general, is that the function of a model 
and its parts is to represent the world and provide information about a worldly target. This intended 
function provides an accordingly general explanation of why “explosive”, contradiction-utilizing 
surrogative inferences do not count as representational. The only legitimate surrogative inferences 
are those that use a model’s parts for their intended function. And nature cannot contain any 
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contradictions, complaints from dialetheists be damned. So, it is literally impossible for a use of a 
model that generates a contradiction to count as a function-fulfilling use, much less a function-
aimed use. Again, generating a contradiction cannot have been the intended function of having 
represented electrons a particular way. (Barring, of course, the sudden appearance per impossibile 
of a contradiction in the wild.) Even with inconsistent models, the only moves in “gameplay” that 
genuinely constitute a model’s representational capacity are those which cohere with its parts’ 
intended function. 
 
6 Conclusion  
  
I have argued that inferentialist views of scientific representation, left unamended or unprecisified, 
face a serious challenge. Because many representational apparatuses in science are idealized in 
internally inconsistent ways, they appear to support an unlimited number of valid surrogative 
inferences regarding their target, and any target. Clearly, however, inconsistent models do not 
represent their targets with unlimited inferential capacity, nor do they represent absolutely 
everything. So, there needs to be an explanation of why the possible contradiction-based 
surrogative inferences in an internally inconsistent model do not contribute to its representational 
capacity. I have argued that the inbuilt behavior of the “world of the model” exerts norms on how 
its parts may be used in surrogative inferences. And even more than the behavior of the world of 
the model, I have argued that a model’s parts’ intended function draws principled boundaries on 
how the properties of the model can be used. For even in cases of internally contradictory models, 
the intended function of a model’s representational content is to facilitate inferences about the 
world, not to facilitate exploitative behavior. To sum up, by developing the ways that the aims of 
scientific representation can exert non-logical norms on how they are used, I have shown how 
inferentialists can avoid the challenge from inconsistent idealizations, as well as further clarified 
exactly what the components of surrogative inference should be on an inferentialist view of 
scientific representation.  
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